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ISSN 0455 - 04201. Policy Risks in the Transformation of East Germany
East Germany can be considered a laboratory experiment in the
economics of transition. Of the three major issues of economic
reform in the transformation process [Siebert, 1991c], two were
solved nearly instantaneously. Monetary stabilization was
achieved by extending the currency area of the D-mark to East
Germany in the currency union of July 1, 1990. And the institu-
tional infrastructure was, in principle, introduced with one
stroke when East Germany joined West Germany according to Article
23 of the German constitution. Thus, only the third major area of
reform remains to be solved, namely the real adjustment in the
economy, especially in the previously state-owned firms. The
transformation of the East German economy thus can be viewed to
be a specific exercise in real economic adjustment.
In this paper, I look at some of the risks that may arise from
the transformation process in east Germany for German economic
policy. Some factors which represented risks in 1990 no longer do
so because prima vista they have already had either positive or
negative outcomes (Section 2). The remaining risks relate to
getting trapped on a low level of development in east Germany
(Section 3), to privatization getting stuck (Section 4), to an
explicit structural policy (Section 5), to the persistence of the
second labor market (Section 6), and to transfers turning into a
burden for Germany as a whole (Section 7). Some conclusions are
drawn in Section 8.
2. Three Risks from Hindsight
Two years ago, one major risk of German unification was the
political mechanism by which the two Germanies would merge. More
specifically, the debate on a revision of the constitution
between independent states would have required one or two years;
this would have been associated with high economic uncertainty,
negatively affecting public transfers into East Germany, reducing
*I appreciate comments from Alfred Boss, Ralph Heinrich, Michael
Hiither, and Klaus-Dieter Schmidt.private capital flows, raising interest rates, and depreciating
the D-mark. This risk has not materialized due to East Germany
accepting the German constitution, which will now be revised
under different conditions.
Another risk related to inflationary pressures due to the conver-
sion rate chosen in extending the currency area of the D-mark to
East Germany in the currency union. Judging from the inflation
rate for West Germany of 2.7 percent in 1990 and 3.5 percent in
1991, one may come to the conclusion that the inflationary risk
did not materialize. Looking more closely; the file cannot be
closed yet. From May 1990
1 to May 1991, M-3 increased by 20
percent [Bundesbank, Monatsberichte]. Taking into account that
the production of east Germany accounted for 6.9 percent of the
west German level in 1991 and allowing for a normal increase in
the money supply of 5 percent in west Germany, there was, arith-
metically, an excess supply of money amounting to 8 percent of
the total money supply. Note that the interest rate structure was
slightly positive in 1990.
The above calculation, however, is somewhat misleading because
east Germans are not yet used to the portfolio choices typical of
a market economy and money serves as a substitute of nonmonetary
financial assets. Thus, money balances held by the nonbanking
sector do not necessarily represent a direct source of infla-
tionary pressure. Sight deposits are, however, available for
credit expansion; moreover, once money balances are dissolved and
being spent on other assets, the adjustment of portfolios may
influence the money supply. Finally, it is hard to say to what
extent this portfolio aspect compensates for the arithmetical
excess supply. Thus, the question remains whether the monetary
coat of 1990 had oversize.
In any case, the Bundesbank followed a policy of mopping up some
of the excess supply of money, thus reducing the rate of increase
The figure for June 1990 was already affected by the currency
union.in the money supply in the first half of 1991. The interest rate
structure became inverse in 1991, pointing to a restrictive
monetary policy. Thus, the currency union had implications in
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1991. Moreover, if one takes into account that there is a time
lag of two years and more until the increase in the money supply
affects the price level [Scheide, 1991; Bundesbank, Monatsbericht
January 1992], the price increase in 1991 and 1992 may be, in
part, the result of the 1990 increase in the money supply. Last
but not least, the change in the price level will affect wage
demands in west Germany in 1992.
We also know more about the third risk factor of the year 1990,
namely wage costs. From the second quarter of 1990 to the fourth
quarter of 1991, the effective wage per employee in east Germany
rose by 64 percent. At the end of 1991, wage contracts for east
Germany were concluded, reaching 60-65 percent of the west German
nominal level; the Sachverstandigenrat expects that on average
east German employees will reach 70 percent of the west German
contract wage level in 1992. In April 1991, the effective wage
income per employee was 47.1 percent of the west German level
[Sachverstandigenrat, 1991b].
The wage increases in east Germany have caused repercussions in a
number of areas. They have made investment less profitable. While
they will not greatly affect capital-intensive projects of west
German or international firms who invest in east Germany, they
will have a negative impact on the birth of new and small firms
which face uncertain revenue, since they are not yet established
in the market. Adjustment of the old state firms is made more
difficult. The demand for labor in the adjustment phase will be
reduced, thus leading to higher unemployment and a greater need
for government programs and transfers. Moreover, the wage level
influences social security payments. Thus, wage policy in east
Germany directly affects fiscal policy.
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The conversion rate influenced the aspiration level of people
in east Germany and therefore increased the pressure for higher
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Source: DIW [1992]; own calculations and estimates.3. Will the Potential Growth Process Become Trapped?
The negative supply shock. The most important question for the
future is whether a self-sustained growth process will start in
east Germany. We know very well from the economics of transition
[Siebert, 1991a; Long and Siebert, 1991] that the transition from
a centralized socialist planning system to a market economy
presents a shock to the representative socialist firm, changing
all its constraints, including the price vector. For the over-
whelming number of firms, this shock can be modelled as a sudden
unexpected drop in the producer's price. This implies that the
capital stock of the firm or the firm itself as a net of contrac-
tual relationships becomes largely obsolete.
If we aggregate over all firms, the capital stock of the economy
becomes obsolete to a considerable degree. It has to be rebuilt
through investment. Human capital in its given occupations is
also partly made obsolete, although the qualifications of east
German workers are judged as being not too different from those
of west Germans. By reallocating and retraining the work force,
human capital can adjust. The concept of obsoleteness can also be
applied to infrastructure capital, which has to be improved and
restructured. Another stock variable that is made obsolete is the
spatial structure of the economy. Last but not least, the capital
of nature, the environment, which was polluted in the old system,
will have to be restored.
For the adjustment process of the economy in transition to a
market system, we obtain a J-curve of aggregate output, which
falls abruptly and eventually catches up with the adjustment of
firms going on and new firms coming into existence. In 1991, the
bottom of the J-curve of output was reached in east Germany.
Output of the manufacturing industry was at one-third of the 1989
level; GNP was DM 193.1 billion in 1991, 6.9 percent of the west
German level (whereas population is 25 percent).
A self-sustained growth process has not yet begun. Aggregate
domestic demand of east Germany amounted to DM 361.2 billion in
1991, i.e., 187 percent of GNP (Table A2). The trade deficit wasDM 168.1 billion. Aggregate demand is financed by transfers which
are estimated at DM 145 billion for the government sector.
Catchinq-up calculations. A simple formula tells us how much time
is needed for east Germany to catch up with west Germany. Consid-
er a situation where east Germany reaches 80 percent of the west
German level of GNP per capita. This is not an unrealistic
figure, since in west Germany some regions reach a similar
percentage. Then, everything depends on the difference in the
real growth rates between east and west Germany. Table 1 shows
for various growth differentials the years needed to reach the
80 percent level. Such calculations should be taken with some
caution. It is quite conceivable that in specific years high
growth rates in the 15-20 percent range will occur in east
Germany.
Table 1 - Time Needed to Reach 80 Percent of the West German
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ECapital requirements and output effects. Assuming that east
Germany will have the same capital stock per capita as west
Germany after the transformation process has ended, the capital
A
stock of the enterprise sector would be DM 1,196 billion (Table
A5). This is a back-of-the-envelope calculation for the accumu-
lated investment, assuming that the existing capital stock is
completely obsolete. Infrastructure capital in west Germany
amounted to DM 2,187 billion in 1988 [Sachverstandigenrat,
1991b]. This figure includes public buildings and equipment,
roads, rail, postal and communication infrastructure and water-
ways . Using the infrastructure of west Germany as a frame of
reference, infrastructure capital in east Germany would amount to
DM 547 billion. Assuming that one-third of the capital stock is
usable and considering a ten-year period of adjustment, a rough
calculation shows that private investment of DM 80 billion and
public investment of DM 40 billion per year, i.e., DM 120 billion
per year, would be needed.
Self-sustained growth can only start if the obsolete stock
variables are rebuilt from scratch. Investment in 1991 was DM
72.4 billion which was 38 percent of the actual east German GNP,
but is far too low relative to the potential GNP of DM 650
billion that east Germany might have after the complete adjust-
ment process. Investment per capita was half of the west German
figure. More specifically, private investment, which amounted to
50 percent of total investment in east Germany, is too low. For
1992, investment of DM 90 billion is expected [Sachverstandigen-
rat, 1991b].
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The total west German capital stock was DM 11,649 billion in
1990, that of the enterprise sector DM 4,785 billion.
The residual of the gross capital stock of DM 2,218 billion
does not relate to the enterprises nor to housing, but refers
inter alia to buildings and equipment of the government (DM 816
billion) and to nonprofit organizations (DM 218 billion).
Calculations of public investment do not include environmental
protection.10
It would be tempting to apply the west German capital-output
ratio to determine the investment needed in order to reach a
specific growth rate or to calculate the growth effect of a given
investment. For instance, applying the west German average
capital-output ratio of 4.4 to the investment of DM 90 billion
expected for 1992, the increase in GNP will be DM 20 billion.
Private investment of DM 45 billion would yield an increase in
GNP of DM 17 billion, using the capital-output ratio of the
enterprise sector of 2.6. These calculations are misleading
because in an economy where the capital stock is rebuilt from
scratch, we should expect the output effect of investment to be
higher than the average capital-output ratio. Thus, it is more
promising to apply the marginal capital-output ratio, which can
be expected to be lower than the average ratio. In addition, the
marginal capital-output ratios of the late forties and the early
fifties is an indication of the output effects that are possible
under the most favorable circumstances.
Measuring the marginal output-capital ratio by the increase in
GNP to the increase in the gross capital stock, the marginal
output-capital ratio shows great variation since 1950. Whereas in
the late eighties values were around 0.45, the early fifties saw
values larger than 1 (Table A6) . This would indicate a situation
in which investment would increase GNP by the same amount.
Time lags and bottlenecks. The east German experience reminds us
that a supply response needs time as was demonstrated by the two
oil shocks. The Erhard reforms of 1948 cannot be used as a frame
of reference for a quick take-off, since prior to 1948 adjustment
had already taken place to some extent. Industrial output rose
from one-quarter of the 1936 level in 1945 to roughly half of the
1936 level in 1948 [Schmieding, 1991]. Moreover, in east Germany
special conditions for the depreciation of stock variables
prevailed. The exchange rate could not be used as a buffer; wage
increases have not been in line with productivity increases.
In the long run, east Germany has a positive growth perspective
due to the incentives of the market system, due to the capital
accumulation which will be associated with a high growth rate,11
and due to the integration in the international division of labor
[Siebert, 1991b]. A major issue, however, is to what extent
bottlenecks in east Germany hinder investment and prevent the
growth process from starting and gaining momentum. These bottle-
necks are the uncertainty with respect to property rights, a
shortage of location space, a public administration that had (and
still has) to be built up, and an insufficient infrastructure in
communications and transportation.
Over time, the factors limiting growth will become less impor-
tant. This can be expected for public administration. A quick
improvement in the infrastructure hinges on a number of issues.
First, government planning tends to be slow, especially when it
involves several layers of government. Second, budgetary pro-
cesses are time-consuming. Here, privatization of parts of the
infrastructure can help in bringing about an improved supply of
infrastructure more quickly and more efficiently. Third, larger
infrastructure projects in west Germany, such as main highways or
new railroad tracks, require up to twenty years from the start of
planning to completion. This is mainly due to the institutional
set-up of the authorization procedure, including the procedural
steps, especially in the administrative court systems. The clash
of interest between the growth target and environmental protec-
tion is at the root of the problem. It is quite clear that with
time horizons of this length, the infrastructure in east Germany
cannot be built up quickly. It remains to be seen whether a law
attempting to reduce the requirements for the authorization
procedure would be successful.
4. Will Privatization Get Stuck?
The systematic issue. Uncertainty about property rights is
estimated to be the most important bottleneck to a self-sustained
growth process. Three different categories of property are
involved: land including buildings (not firms) where the previous
owners have a right to be restituted, those firms which will be
given back to their previous owners, and state-owned firms whose
new ownership has to be established. The systematic problem is
that ownership of land and ownership of firms are disjunct and12
that the assignment of property titles, i.e., the mapping of
objects and owners, may be inconsistent.
The status of the privatization process. There are 1.2 million
applications for restitution of the ownership of land. Each of
these applications has to be decided on administratively, whereby
title records are not up to date and inheritance relationships
are rather complex. Moreover, each administrative decision can be
challenged in the administrative court system. It is estimated by
experts that it will take ten years to clarify these ownership
claims.
Reprivatization relates to 17,000 firms of which roughly 4,000
have been given back by September 1991. The most important issue
is the privatization of previously state-owned firms. The "small"
privatization program, i.e., the privatization of stores, small
hotels, etc., has been completed. By January 31, 1992, the
Treuhand had privatized 5,584 out of 11,293 firms in the produc-
tive sector, i.e., 49.4 percent (see also Table A4). According to
the sales contracts, the employment of 970,000 persons and the
investment of DM 87 billion is expected. In addition, an invest-
ment of DM 30 billion in the energy sector is planned. The
Treuhand still has 1.65 million employees, after starting out
with 4.08 million. Unfortunately, we have no information on the
type and structure of firms that still have to be privatized.
There remains a sizeable task of privatization. The risk now is
that the privatization of firms will become more difficult. The
filet mignons have been privatized, and less attractive firms
remain. In the privatization market, the demand for firms to be
sold may be lower. At the same time, more firms will have to be
closed. By January 1992, the Treuhand had closed 1,079 firms
employing 188,000. The closing of firms will lead to political
pressure in the regions affected. But there is also the political
demand that firms which cannot be privatized should remain under
government ownership, so that the Treuhand would develop into a
government trust.13
Solutions. Whenever the principle of reinstating the previous
owner and privatization are in conflict, a new law (Vermogensge-
setz) attempts to give preference to investment and employment.
This law may have some positive effect but it does not appear to
change the situation fundamentally. Its main result has been to
somewhat affect the bargaining position of the previous owner
relative to the investor and the Treuhand. As a matter of fact,
one solution to the uncertainty about property rights is a
contractual arrangement by these three parties whereby still
existing risks are allocated between them. For instance, the
Treuhand may cover a potential investor against the risk of
possibly having to give back parts of his firm to a previous
owner (who may not be known today). These contractual arrange-
ments have to be developed on a case-by-case basis. The other
solution to the uncertainty about property rights is for an
investor to circumvent land or firms loaded with uncertainty by
constructing houses or establishing new firms on the green
meadow.
The Treuhand has used an informal bargaining approach, which has
shortcomings because it is discretionary and because it allows
strategic behavior on the part of the buyer. The Treuhand claims
that the sale situation is complex and cannot easily be standard-
ized. Moreover, multiple criteria including the sales price,
investment and employment guarantees, and the reputation of the
buyer supposedly do not allow a formal sales procedure. Instead
of informal bargaining, the Treuhand should use a two-stage
bidding process in which in the first round it collects all the
relevant information on the buyer's willingness to pay, to
invest, and to employ. In the second round, a contract specifying
investment and employment plans could be auctioned off, with the
sales price being the only variable. In many cases, reputational
constraints could be introduced in the first round.
The core activity of privatization should be discontinued on
December 31, 1994. Firms for which an investor has not been found
by then must be closed. Only in rare cases can they be handed
over to the respective states (Lander). It should be made explic-
it, however, that federal funds are not available for those firms14
owned by the Lander. If the Lander wish to subsidize these firms,
the subsidies must compete directly with other expenditures of
the Lander.
5. An Explicit: Structural Policy?
The opportunity cost of a conservationist policy. The breakdown
of the east German economy has led to the political call for an
explicit structural policy for east Germany. The main argument is
to soften the adjustment process for firms in order to reduce the
negative impact on employment.
Such a policy would perpetuate the inefficiency of the socialist
planning system because it would de facto be oriented towards the
old structures. The option of modernizing east Germany would be
lost. East Germany would remain a problem area for many years to
come.
The inefficient firms would have to be subsidized heavily. Being
determined in the political process, subsidies will become
locked in, and it will be extremely difficult to reduce them in
the future. Moreover, managers and entrepreneurs will be engaged
in rent seeking instead of fulfilling their role of innovating
and implementing new allocations of production factors.
Subsidized old firms get in the way of new firms. They block
location space that is needed for the creation of new firms. This
is especially relevant when location space is in short supply due
to the uncertainty about property rights. We also know from West
German sectoral policy that subsidized firms tend to set the wage
rate of a region. Subsidies allow them to pay a high wage, which
impedes the new firms. Last but not least, subsidized firms often
compete with new firms on the product markets.
Uncoupling the protection of people and the protection of firms.
The alternative to such a conservationist policy is to uncouple
the protection of people and the conservation of inefficient
firms. Transfers to people will ease the burden of adjustment.
Basically, this approach is followed in the German case with15
transfers to those on short-time work and active forms of employ-
ment policies (among them so-called "employment companies")
relating to 400,000 persons at the end of 1991. In 1991, DM 18.5
billion were spent on active employment policies, excluding DM
7.8 billion for unemployment benefits.
Industrial targeting. There is not only a political call for a
structural policy for the existing firms, but also additional
pressure for a more active role of government in developing
future industries. It is argued that the government should decide
which sectors should be developed and which industries should be
targeted for the future. This approach is very likely to be a
severe failure. First, the government does not have information
on which products will sell well, which production procedure will
be very efficient, and which industry will flourish in the
future. The root of the issue is the Hayekian problem of informa-
tion on future economic and technological possibilities. This
information is not available today, and the incentive mechanism
is decisive for revealing this information. Industrial targeting
will forego competition as an exploratory device [Hayek, 1968];
by not allocating the risks of failure to the investor such a
policy would set the wrong incentives.
Implications for fiscal policy. If decisions on the future
sectoral structure are politicized, it can also be expected that
the controlling mechanism of markets will be pushed to the
background. Consider the case that a political decision has been
taken and that this decision turns out to be an economic failure;
then it is very likely that the political process will attempt to
cover up its previous decision and legitimize it ex post by
granting new subsidies. Thus, there is an endogenous process that
potentially leads to inefficiency.
Both a conservationist structural policy and industrial targeting
would have strong implications for fiscal policy. Since the
existing firms are inefficient, the financial means needed would
be immense and subsidies would have to be provided for a longer
period. They would trickle away without making the east German
industry more competitive. The sums required would dominate16
German fiscal policy for the years to come and the necessary
consolidation of the budget would be made much more difficult.
This is a severe risk for German economic policy.
Spatial hysteresis? Related to the problem of structural policy
is the issue whether east Germany will be characterized by
spatial hysteresis. In such a scenario the given spatial struc-
ture would not change very much. Is such a scenario likely?
Some areas in east Germany will have an economic-geographic
position more in the center. Berlin has the potential to be a
strong growth pole due to its role as the capital of Germany.
Areas with a favorable position in the hierarchy of infrastruc-
ture and with policy-induced centers of administration like the
capitals of the newly formed federal states in east Germany are
also likely to develop into growth poles. The former border
regions will be more intensively integrated into west Germany and
this will improve their economic conditions. We can also expect
that areas well endowed with skilled labor and engineering
talents will develop favorably, among them Sachsen and Thiiringen,
which were the birth places of German engineering. Some pockets
such as Eisenach, Mosel near Zwickau and Ludwigsfelde are already
showing positive signs of development.
Restructuring will be much more difficult in old industrial areas
with a heavy concentration of inefficient firms. Due to the
extreme specialization of firms in east Germany, these industrial
areas will often have a monostructure in which one industry
dominates (shipbuilding at the Baltic Sea, steel industry in
Eisenhiittenstadt, textiles in Sachsen, chemistry in Bitterfeld).
Where ecological damages of the past are concentrated, they
impede restructuring (Bitterfeld). The rural areas in the north-
ern part of east Germany represent another aspect of monostruc-
ture. Finally, regions adjoining Poland and Czechoslovakia will
become relatively more peripheral.
In these problem areas, spatial hysteresis cannot be ruled out
completely. The outcome will depend on whether the Treuhand will
succeed in privatizing firms in the problem regions and on17
whether structural policy will perpetuate the existing ineffi-
cient structures.
6. Will the Second Labor Market Persist?
A differentiation of wages. Wages are expected to reach an
average level of 70 percent of the west German wage level in
mid-1992. Although it seems difficult to postpone the equaliza-
tion of wages for long, policy must attempt to delay the adjust-
ment. The best option would be to have a strong wage differen-
tiation with respect to regions, sectors and firms. For instance,
contract wages could rise at some base rate; markets could
differentiate the wage rate. Alternatively, wage contracts could
be opened up, allowing a deviation to a lower wage for firms
which are in trouble; this can only be brought about if some
elements of German labor market regulation, such as declaring
labor contracts as mandatory, are temporarily not applied.
The second labor market. In east Germany, a second labor market
has been established with an artificial, government-sponsored
demand for labor. The policy instruments used are transfers to
short-time workers amounting to roughly 90 percent of previous
salaries up to June 1991. Retraining of people, including re-
training in "employment companies," is another policy measure. At
the end of 1991, 400,000 people were covered by retraining
activities. In addition, 360,000 people were in a public work
program. The government-sponsored activities of the second labor
market, for instance, "employment companies," compete with the
regular sector of the economy; they compete in the goods markets
because they produce commodities that could be produced by
private firms. And they compete in the labor market because they
pay nearly the same wage as the regular sector. Thus, the incen-
tive to move out of the second labor market is small.
The emergence of the second labor market is the result of uncou-
pling the protection of people from subsidizing old firms. In
order to prevent the risk of wasting resources in preserving the
inefficient old firms, a new risk arises. For instance, an
organizational structure of "employment companies" is being18
established with a three-level structure: there is an "employment
company" on the level of each state, in each labor-office dis-
trict, and on a more local level. These organizational structures
will have their own political weight, and it may be difficult to
undo them when the economic situation improves.
One policy instrument, namely the very generous short-time work
arrangement which was specifically designed to east Germany and
which affected two million people at its climax in April 1991,
was discontinued at the end of 1991. With respect to this policy
instrument, the second labor market was not perpetuated.
The role of labor market institutions. The risks arising from
wage policy and from a second labor market can only be understood
in the context of the institutional arrangement of the labor
market in Germany. Employment relations with governmental "em-
ployment companies" are interpreted as regular labor contracts;
consequently, it is argued that the second labor market cannot
have a wage different from the first labor market. Wage contracts
are declared mandatory by the government, thus applying to
nonunion workers as well. As a consequence, any differentiation
of wages between regions and firms is not possible. So far, it is
nearly impossible for firms that are in trouble to obtain a firm-
specific contract. Another important feature of the German labor
law is that the new owner of a firm inherits the old wage con-
tracts and takes over people actually employed according to
Article 613a of the German Civil Code. The new owner cannot lay
off employees and has to pay the same wage. This is definitely
not an incentive to acquire state-owned firms. Even if the new
owner leaves the employer's association, he is bound by the wage
contracts bargained by his predecessors, i.e., the managers of
the old planning system. It has not been possible to suspend
g
Article 613a of the German Civil Code.
§ 63, 5 Arbeitsforderungsgesetz Ost; now § 63, 4 applies.
8
Article 613a has been suspended temporarily in the case of
bankruptcy.19
The influence of German labor market regulation on the privat-
ization and the restructuring of firms in east Germany points to
the more general question of how the adjustment of east Germany
is negatively affected by the institutional arrangement that has
developed in west Germany. Rules that may be fitting for a
relatively rich economy with a rather continuous growth process
and gradual structural adjustment to the world economy are not
necessarily applicable to an economy in transition [Sachverstan-
digenrat, 1991b]. This relates not only to the labor market, but
also to the political and judicial process of providing infra-
structure, to regulations in the transportation and telecommuni-
cations sectors, to the institutional arrangement of the energy
sector, as well as to other areas. Another important impact of
the institutional arrangement of the west German economy is that
in principle these rules define the protection level of people,
i.e., unemployment compensation, social welfare payments, etc.
Thus, these institutional arrangements define something like the
social minimal income or the reservation wage. They have defi-
nitely influenced the transfers to east Germany.
7. The Fiscal Policy Risk
Budget deficit. All the risks discussed so far will have an
impact on fiscal policy. Public transfers to east Germany are
estimated at DM 145 billion for 1992, with gross transfers
amounting to DM 225 billion.
The overall German government budget deficit, including the
federal, state and municipal levels as well as the social securi-
ty system, amounted to DM 130 billion in 1991; this is 4.6
percent of GNP (Table 2). The 1992 overall governmental budget
deficit is expected to be DM 160 billion, that is 5.4 percent of
GNP. These data include the deficit of the German Unity Fund and
of the Treuhand, which are estimated at DM 31 billion for 1992.
If the governmental telecommunications service and the railroads
are included, the public sector capital demand will amount to
roughly DM 180 billion in 1992.
Shadow budgets. Budget risks relate to several factors (Table 3).
One is the deficit of the Treuhand, which will increase if the20






























Source: Sachverstandigenrat [1991b]; Boss [1991]; own calculations.
Table 3 - Financial Burden to the Public Sector(a) from Shadow Budgets
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Source: Boss et al. [1992]; own calculations.21
Treuhand does not succeed in privatizing firms. In 1991, a defi-
cit of DM 20 billion was recorded. Including the deficit of 1990,
the debt of the Treuhand was DM 25 billion at the end of 1991. In
addition, the Treuhand has guaranteed loans for DM 30 billion; a
large part of these guarantees will become effective. Old debts
of firms that are to be or already have been privatized will be
taken over by the Treuhand; this debt amounts to DM 70 lion.
In addition, compensating claims of firms "for losses due to cur-
rency conversion" of DM 20 billion have to be added. (This posi-
tion enters the asset side of the firms.) Taking environmental
liabilities of DM 45 billion into account, it is estimated that
the Treuhand may accumulate a debt of DM 250 billion up to 1994.
Revenue of DM 50 billion is expected from the selling of land.
Another risk is the financing of labor market policies. The so-
cial security system will have a deficit of DM 10 billion in 1992
mainly because of additional labor market policy measures and be-
cause of additional benefits for the elderly in east Germany; the
contributions to the social security system will have to be
raised notably in the first half of the nineties in order to
avoid budget deficits. This will have a negative impact on the
demand for labor and on economic activity in general.
At the end of 1993, the Credit Processing Fund (Kreditabwick-
lungsfonds), which manages the liabilities of the former GDR
state, will have to be taken over by the Treuhand; if the Treu-
hand has not accumulated assets as can be expected, half of the
Credit Processing Fund will have to be taken over by the federal
government and the other half by the new Lander. It is estimated
by the Federal Ministry of Finance that a debt of DM 100 billion
will have been accumulated by the fund. The German Unity Fund,
funded by the federal government and the Lander, will have accu-
mulated DM 95 billion at the end of 1994. The moratorium on mort-
gages for the housing sector relating to a debt of DM 50 billion
will stop in 1993.
But there are other risks as well. One is defaults on East Euro-
pean debts, especially the former Soviet Union debt, and a non-
payment of export credits. In both cases, the government will be22
involved because debt and export credits were guaranteed by the
government. In addition, transfers may be needed for Eastern Eu-
rope. This may become relevant when migration from Eastern Europe
picks up. Last but not least, contributions to the European Com-
munity are likely to increase, for instance due to the distribu-
tive policies in preparation of the European Monetary Union.
The debt of all public budgets, which amounted to DM 929 billion
in 1989, will have reached DM 1,800 billion - 1.8 trillion - by
1994. Thus, public debt will double within five years. In rela-
tive terms, the ratio of public debt to GNP will rise from 41
percent (1989) to 53 percent (1994). Public expenditures relative
to GNP has risen from 45 percent (1989) to 50 percent (1991).
The need for consolidation. The risk for the future is that the
budget deficit will have a strong impact on economic policy. The
government may lose its maneuvering space due to high interest
payments. Unexpected expenditures may arise. Government revenue
may fall due to a less favorable business cycle. Financing expen-
ditures may raise either interest rates or taxes and this will
choke off investment. The most important danger is that the fi-
nancial constraints will develop into a severe burden for the
west German economy, which has to finance transfers to east Ger-
many. This could trigger a vicious circle in which the problems
of the east eventually influence the efficiency of the west.
In order to reduce this risk, a consolidation strategy is re-
quired [Sachverstandigenrat, 1991b]. The principal task must be
to bring down the budget deficit/GNP ratio. This should be done
by cutting expenditures • The politically easiest way to do this
is to cap the nominal increase in government expenditures. Where-
as the federal government is attempting to keep the nominal in-
crease of expenditures below 3 percent, there is no mechanism
available by which the Lander and the municipalities in west Ger-
many can be forced to reduce their spending. Instead of limiting
the increase of expenditures, it would be more appropriate to cut
expenditures including subsidies and to restructure expenditures
under the new economic environment of a united Germaly. In many
areas, west Germany and east Germany compete for investable23
funds. This holds, of course, for infrastructure projects in west
Germany which may be postponed for a year or two; it applies to
subsidies for specific west German sectors, such as the hard coal
industry, which competes directly with the brown coal industry in
east Germany, and it holds for regional policy subsidies going to
regions in west Germany that are better off than areas in east
Germany. So far, the political process has not had enough vigor
to restructure governmental expenditures. The German public has
not yet understood that the unification of Germany has changed
some conditions that were basic to West German policies and that
no longer prevail.
Shifting investment to the private sector. Privatizing infra-
structure is an interesting option to reduce governmental expen-
diture; in east Germany, it would have the additional advantage
of providing infrastructure much more quickly. The communications
industry could have been privatized, financing itself by means of
user charges. Unfortunately, this policy has not been followed.
German economic policy has not been daring and innovative enough
to introduce the privatization of some parts of infrastructure.
Privatization still is an option in the transportation sector,
for instance, with respect to airports and other areas of trans-
portation such as major roads or railroad connections; privatiza-
tion can also be used for industrial parks and local environmen-
tal projects like water purification plants. In these cases, the
government would only have to set the frame of reference under
which private projects can be undertaken.
Intergovernmental transfers in a federal system. An important is-
sue for the future is the division of tasks among the federal
government, the states and the municipalities with respect to
public expenditure and revenue. In the long run, a new system of
intergovernmental transfers (Finanzausgleich) will have to be de-
veloped for Germany, with new rules for allocating government in-
come and expenditure to the three layers of government. In the
present system, the states only have a minor authority in deter-
mining their revenue. More autonomy on the revenue side, and con-
sequently on the expenditure side, could be introduced, for in-
stance, by means of a state-specific income tax rule. This would24
bring about a process of institutional competition among states
both on the expenditure and the revenue side. In the very long
run, such an approach could go together with a redefinition of
states so that they are viable.
8. Conclusions
The review of risk factors of German economic policy analyzed in
this paper shows the solution must be to reduce these risks by
implementing the appropriate policy measures. In the sense of a
causal therapy, preference must be given to stimulating the re-
newal of the stock variables that were made obsolete in the tran-
sition to a market economy. Thus, the goal must be to bring about
private investment, to reduce the bottlenecks hindering the self-
sustained growth process, to continue the privatization process
and to abstain from structural policy. The second labor market
must be scaled down over time, and, of course, a delay of the
equalization in wages between east and west Germany would be most
helpful in bringing about an increase in economic activity in
east Germany. With respect to fiscal policy, a budget situation
that would become uncontrollable must be prevented.
Two opposite scenarios for united Germany were drawn very early
in the discussion [Siebert, 1990]: the Mezzogiorno and the New
Frontier. In the worst case, existing inefficient firms are sub-
sidized in order to protect people. The inefficiency of the east
German economy carries on and the opportunity to modernize it is
squandered. Then, a severe drain on Germany's resources would af-
fect the maneuvering space of fiscal policy in the future. In the
alternative scenario, the positive effects of German unification
prevail after the bottlenecks have been overcome. Unification
represents a New Frontier, an investment opportunity or in Schum-
peter's [1934] terms a case of "creative destruction." Integra-
tion gains, the new economic system and capital accumulation will
all play their role. Economic policy will decide which scenario
will eventually materialize.Appendix








































































































































































































Source: Statistisches Bundesamt [1992]; DIW [1992]; Sachverstandigenrat [1991b].
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(a) Figures for 1989 and the first two
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Table A5 - Capital Stock and Investment in East Germany and West Germany










































































the West German capital stock in 1990. - (b)
Including goods-producing crafts. - (c) New
(d) Evaluated at replacement costs, yearly
ways and civil engineering, including rail
stock at 1986 prices. - (f) The residual is
structure. It includes the capital stock of
not include the infrastructure
service. - (g) Including roads,
and telecommunications systems;
construction and modernization. -
averages, excluding roads, water-
and postal service. - (e) Capital
not identical to public infra-
nonprofit organizations; it does
of the railroads and the telecommunications
waterways,
for 1988.
sewage systems, as well as rail
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt [1990]; Staatliche Zentralverwaltung [1989];
own estimates.30
Table A6 - Gross Capital Stock, GNP, and Marginal Output-Capital Ratios for
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